Intelligence Authorization - H.R.3494

Federal intelligence programs would be reauthorized through fiscal 2020 by H.R. 3494.

The bill would require an assessment of Russian efforts to influence the elections in the U.S. and elsewhere, regular reports on cybersecurity threats to U.S. federal elections, and reports on the unauthorized release of classified information.

No annual intelligence authorization bill has been enacted since the fiscal 2017 authorization was included in that year’s omnibus spending law (Public Law 115-31). The House passed a fiscal 2018 authorization bill (H.R. 3180 in the 115th Congress) in July 2017, which the Senate didn’t consider.

The measure would authorize intelligence community (IC) programs for fiscal 2019 and 2020 and would retroactively authorize fiscal 2018 appropriations for intelligence activities. Most of the authorizations are classified.

The bill “will improve the IC’s collection and analysis capabilities against hard targets, will help the IC adapt to operate in an environment of rapidly advancing technologies, and will foster a culture in the IC to ensure that we can recruit and retain the best and brightest,” House Intelligence Committee Chairman Adam Schiff (D-Calif.) said in a news release.

Authorizations

The measure covers 16 agencies or offices, including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Department, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and military services.

The unclassified authorizations would be:

• $565.6 million for the DNI Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal 2020 and $522.4 million for fiscal 2019.
• $514 million for the CIA Retirement and Disability Fund for each of fiscal 2019 and 2020.

The administration requested $62.8 billion for fiscal 2020 and $59.9 billion for fiscal 2019 for the intelligence community. Those amounts include Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds that are exempt from statutory budget caps. Under current law, the director of national intelligence (DNI) is required to release the topline request, while details remain classified. 

Russian Election Influence

The DNI would have to report to Congress on the intelligence community’s posture to analyze Russian efforts to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, including assessments of available resources, information sharing, and any needed legal authorities. It would be due within one year of the bill’s enactment.

The DNI would develop a “whole-of-government” strategy to detect, counter, and deter Russian cyberattacks against U.S. election systems. The DNI would have to brief Congress within 90 days of the bill’s enactment.

The DNI would have to analyze the most significant Russian influence campaigns around the world, if any, in the past three years. The analysis also would examine current or planned significant influence campaigns. The report would be due within 60 days of enactment and would include any defenses by the targeted country and assistance from the U.S. intelligence community.

Cyberthreats to Federal Campaigns

The Homeland Security Department (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis would have to report to Congress within 60 days of enactment on foreign government cyberattacks against voter registration databases, voting machines, and computer networks in connection with the 2016 presidential election.

The DNI would have to designate an officer within the National Counterintelligence and Security Center to lead efforts related to election security. The officer would have to coordinate counterintelligence matters relating to the risks posed by foreign interference in the election supply chain, electronic voting systems and software, and election infrastructure.

The DNI would have to complete assessments of foreign intelligence threats and security vulnerabilities in state election systems at least 180 days before each regularly scheduled federal election. Updates would be due 90 days before each election.

One year before each federal election, the DNI would have to post online an advisory report on foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats that would include best practices campaigns can use and identify any publicly available resources. 
The FBI and DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis could make additional information available to campaigns they jointly determine are subject to a heightened foreign threat.

The DNI, FBI, and DHS would jointly brief Congress if a foreign state or nonstate actor has conducted a “significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign” to influence a federal election.

The DNI would have to support DHS in sponsoring top secret security clearances for the chief election officials of each state, territory, and Washington, D.C., to facilitate sharing classified information related to election system threats.

Active Measures Committee

The measure would expand the responsibilities of an interagency committee to counter Russian active measures to exert covert influence. The committee would also counter efforts by China, Iran, and North Korea.

The DNI would report on whether a new Foreign Malign Influence Response Center that cuts across IC elements should be established to provide comprehensive assessments on such activities.

Other Russia Provisions

The DNI would have to submit a report within 60 days of enactment assessing Russian financing of various threats, including cyber operations, influence campaigns, intelligence activities, terrorism, or transnational crime. It would also cover sanctions evasion.

The bill would prohibit any federal agency outside of the Defense Department from spending money to implement any bilateral cybersecurity agreement with Russia unless the DNI reports the agreement to Congress 30 days in advance.

The DNI would have to report on the risks of returning diplomatic compounds in New York, Maryland, and California to Russia. The compounds were seized in response to Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election.

The DNI also would report on:

• The net worth of Russian President Vladimir Putin and his family, including descriptions and details of legitimately and ill-gotten assets, and the methods used to conceal Putin’s ownership interest in them.
• The intentions of Russia’s political leadership related to potential military action against NATO members, responses to enlarged U.S. or NATO military presence in eastern Europe, and potential actions to exploit perceived divisions among Western governments.

Unauthorized Disclosures

The heads of intelligence community elements, as well as relevant inspectors general, would have to report twice per year to Congress on the number of investigations regarding the unauthorized public disclosure of classified information.

For completed investigations, officials would have to provide data on referrals to the Justice Department for criminal investigation. The Justice Department would report semiannually on the status of each referral from an intelligence agency that is pending or was made during the previous 365 days.

Covert Agents

The bill would expand protection of covert intelligence agents who operate domestically. It’s currently illegal to knowingly disclose the identity of a covert agent who lives and acts outside the U.S. or who served outside the country in the last five years.

Security Clearances

The Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability Council would report to Congress with plans to reduce the backlog of background investigations to 200,000 “or an otherwise sustainable steady-level” by the end of 2020. It would be due 90 days after the bill’s enactment.

The council also would report within 180 days of enactment on the future of the personnel security system to reflect the changing workforce, technology, and threats.

The DNI would report annually on security clearances processed by each part of the intelligence community for employees and contractors.

The council would modify the security clearance process with the goal of, by Dec. 31, 2021, making 90% of all determinations on the following timeline:

• Within 30 days for the secret level.
• Within 90 days for the top secret level.
• Within two weeks for recognizing reciprocity of existing clearances.

The measure would require the DNI to develop plans to modify the security clearance process, including by:

• Ensuring that contractors are treated similarly to federal employees.
• Periodically reinvestigating clearances as needed based on risk.
• Allowing agencies to accept automated records checks from an applicant’s previous clearance applications.
• Allowing use of privately collected background materials.

Intelligence Personnel Provisions

Civilian employees in the intelligence community would have access to 12 weeks of paid parental leave. The leave could be taken during the first 12 months following the birth, adoption, or foster care placement of a child. There would be a 30-week lifetime cap on any employee’s parental leave, and it couldn’t be taken for foster care placements expected to last less than one year.

The measure would make changes to some employee payments, including:

• Allowing the NSA to establish special pay rates for positions responsible for executing the agency’s cyber mission.
• Allowing the CIA to increase disability payments to employees for injuries caused by war or terrorist activities after Sept. 11, 2001. The agency could also cover the cost of treatments for such injuries suffered by employees, family members stationed with them, and non-CIA personnel otherwise affiliated with the agency.
• Allowing the CIA to pay subsistence to any personnel assigned to “austere” locations overseas.
• Changing how annuities of CIA employees are calculated.

The measure would allow the DNI to provide protection to former personnel and their immediate families. Current personnel are permitted to receive such protection.

The DNI would have to develop policies to facilitate details of intelligence personnel between the IC and private sector. Initial details would last as long as two years and could be extended to three years. No employee of the intelligence community could be detailed for more than five years in total.

The DNI could provide cyber protection support for the personal devices and accounts of personnel in the intelligence community whose positions make them more vulnerable to cyberattacks and hostile information collection. Support could include training, advice, and other services.

The DNI would report within 180 days of enactment on the potential to establish a student loan repayment and forgiveness program for the intelligence community. It would also report annually on any similar programs at intelligence agencies.

The DNI would create and implement a plan to increase recruitment of personnel from rural and underrepresented regions.

The bill would repeal a foreign language requirement for senior-level CIA positions.

Vulnerability Disclosures

The DNI would submit a report within 90 days of enactment on intelligence agencies’ roles in the vulnerabilities equities process (VEP), which determines whether and how to disclose nonpublic information about a vulnerability with a nonfederal entity or the public.

The DNI would report annually on the VEP, including the number of vulnerabilities submitted for review and the number disclosed.

IT Environment

The DNI would coordinate a shared information technology environment for use across the intelligence community, including by resolving disagreements among agencies about the environment’s implementation.

Each element of the intelligence community would have to use the IT environment’s core services unless the DNI provides a written exception for a compelling financial or mission-related reason.

Twice per year, the DNI would provide to Congress a long-term roadmap with service requirements and implementation milestones. The DNI would also provide a business plan twice a year to ensure adoption across agencies.

The DNI would provide quarterly briefings and notify the intelligence committees of any policy changes affecting the IT environment.

The authority to coordinate the shared environment would expire Sept. 30, 2024.

Energy Department

The measure would consolidate the Energy Department’s intelligence and counterintelligence offices into a single Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, which would be part of the National Intelligence Program.

The president would have to establish an Energy Infrastructure Security Center within the new office to analyze and disseminate intelligence on energy infrastructure. The requirement could be waived if the president determines the center wouldn’t materially improve the government’s ability to prevent attacks on energy infrastructure.

Homeland Security Personnel

The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis would have to identify opportunities to transfer its headquarters personnel to field locations outside the greater Washington, D.C., area. A plan would be due to Congress 120 days after enactment.

Personnel would be collocated with operational units from Customs and Border Protection, the Transportation Security Administration, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and other elements of the department.

China Reports

The National Counterintelligence and Security Center would report annually to Congress on any influence operations in the U.S. conducted by the Communist Party of China, particularly the activities of the United Front Work Department and any related organizations.

The DNI would report to Congress on the threat posed by global and regional adoption of foreign-supplied 5G network equipment. The fiscal 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 115-232 barred U.S. agencies from using networking equipment made by Chinese firm Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd., which the company has challenged in federal court.

The DNI also would report on China’s activities to:

• Repress Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang region, such as the roughly 11 million Uyghurs, through “political reeducation camps” and other means.
• Influence or disrupt elections in Taiwan.

Iran Reports

The measure would require the DNI to report to Congress on Iran’s military support for proxy forces in Syria and Lebanon, including Hezbollah, and the threat posed to Israel and other U.S. allies in the region.

DNI also would submit an annual report on Iran’s spending on military and terrorist activities outside of the country, including any support for Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthi rebels in Yemen, and proxy forces in Iraq and Syria.

North Korea Report

The DNI would produce an intelligence assessment of North Korea’s revenue sources, including coal and iron; fishing rights; precious metals; textiles; defense articles and services; and other activities.

The assessment would also include the networks through which North Korea accesses the U.S. and international financial systems.

Domestic Terrorism

The DNI, FBI, and DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis would report annually through 2025 on domestic terrorism. Reports would include:

• A strategic intelligence assessment of domestic terrorism during the previous fiscal year.
• A discussion of federal response activities, including the criteria for conducting investigations, planning and analysis of intelligence, information sharing, and the criteria used for deciding whether to describe an event as terrorism.
• Data on each domestic terrorism event and related crimes.

Prize Competitions

The Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency would conduct two competitions to award prizes for research, development, or commercialization of technologies related to:

• 5G networks.
• Detecting machine-manipulated media, sometimes called “deepfakes.”

Prizes for each competition could total as much as $5 million.

Contracting

The measure would require the DNI to establish a task force to standardize information sharing between the intelligence community and federal contracting employees, to communicate and address supply chain and counterintelligence risks. The task force would issue an annual report about its activities.

The DNI also would assess contracting practices in the intelligence community in matters involving China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran to ensure that security and counterintelligence risks are properly considered.

Other Provisions

DNI and DOD would submit a plan to Congress to designate the counterintelligence component of the Defense Security Service as an element of the intelligence community.

The DNI would establish a Climate Security Advisory Council to assist intelligence personnel in obtaining and analyzing climate data for its effects on national security and regional political stability. The council also would ensure that climate change is adequately prioritized by the intelligence community.

The measure would require the head of any element of the IC to consider the pervasiveness of technological infrastructure and services provided by U.S. adversaries in a country before entering into an intelligence-sharing agreement with that country.

The jurisdiction of CIA police officers outside the agency’s headquarters and other installations would be extended to 500 yards from the relevant property. The limit is currently 500 feet.

The inspector general of the intelligence community would review the authorities, policies, and standards relating to whistleblower matters. The goal would be to identify discrepancies that hinder reporting by whistleblowers. A report would be due within 270 days of enactment.

Other Reports and Briefings

The DNI would have report to Congress on the death of Jamal Khashoggi, a Washington Post journalist from Saudi Arabia who was murdered in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October 2018. The report would identify anyone who participated in, ordered, or were complicit in Khashoggi’s death. Saudi crown prince Mohammad bin Salman has been connected with the murder.

The DNI would have to report on its role in preparing analytic materials in connection with the federal government’s review of national security risks posed by foreign investments in the U.S.

Other reports and briefings would include:

• A report on the feasibility of setting up a secure mobile voice system for the intelligence community and of encrypting unclassified phone calls between IC personnel.
• A report on the national security implications of water insecurity around the world.
• A briefing on anticipated geopolitical effects of emerging infectious disease.
• A task force report on illicit financing of spying and influence operations targeting the U.S.
• An evaluation of terrorist groups’ use of virtual currencies, also called cryptocurrencies.
• A study on foreign employment of former U.S. intelligence personnel.

Previous Action

The House Intelligence Committee amended and approved H.R. 3494, the “Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020,” by voice vote on June 27.

Schiff introduced the bill a day earlier.

The Senate passed its version of the bill, with the same title, as part of its fiscal 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1790).

The Senate’s provisions were drawn from a standalone measure (S. 1589), which the Senate Intelligence Committee approved 15-0 on May 14, according to a committee news release.

The bills are named for Matt Pollard, a Senate Intelligence Committee staffer who was a member of the Army National Guard and died in April 2018, and Damon Nelson, the House Intelligence Committee staff director who was a Gulf War veteran and died in November 2018.

Prospects

The House Rules Committee said it’s likely to meet the week of July 15 to set the terms of floor debate for H.R. 3494, which could include a structured amendment process. A simple majority would be required for passage.

Differences between the House and Senate versions would have to be reconciled before a measure is sent to the president.